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COMPARISON OF PRC AND VIETNAM'S RESPONSES TO 
THE ELIMINATION OF US TEXTILE AND APPAREL 
QUOTAS: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
International trade in textiles and apparel has, as of January 1, 2005, been set free from the 
very intricate Multi-Fibertextile and apparel quota Arrangement (l\I1F A). This event has raised many 
uncertainties about the new international trade climate and has placed enormous pressure on Olina 
as the expected clear cut beneficiary of this hberalization.' Other countries considered to be major 
contenders include Vietnam which also has a large population employed in the textile and apparel 
(T&A) sector. Since the old quota system had provided a certain degree of market certainty to 
competing T&A producers, will the new free trade environment lead to a shake out where mass 
producers with large economies of scale dominate the new reality? 
The removal of T&A quotas will create opportunities for Vietnam and Olina along with 
other developing countries, but it will also expose them to additional competition from each other. 
The outcome of this competition will depend on the demand in the US, the ability of the exporting 
countries to differentiate their exports and on their ability to transfer additional resources to expand 
domestic output in the direction of the new 'free market signals' and away from rent seeking 
objectives. Obviously, exporting countries that adjust to this new environment quickly will improve 
1 Ollna is currently the major exporter of apparel products. In 2000, it accounted for roughly 18% of total world trade in 
apparel, double its 1990 performance. garments in 2000, up from 9% in 1990. Ollna is tbe largest supplier of apparel 
products to the EU and Japan, and tbe second largest to the US market. Expectations are tbat witb tbe demise of the 
MFA, Ollna's market share of tbe EU and US markets will rise substantially above its current rate of 14 and 11 percent, 
respectively. China's export potential is seen by other developing countries as a source of crowding out. This concern 
may be overstated because China's apparel products have increased in quality far more than its competitors, its export 
prices are much higher than its competitors, and China's labor costs are rising far more than its competitors. 
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their competitiveness, and will be the new beneficiaries of a quota free international trade in textiles 
and apparel. 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the differences and similarities in the responses of 
Cltinese and Vietnamese T&A sectors to this new environment. It first focuses on the demand side 
attempting to detennine whether or not Cltinese and Viemamese T&A items, formally under quota 
control, are substitutes or compliments. On the supply side, the paper focuses on institutional 
differences between each country's T&A sectors, the different domestic government policies that 
have contributed to their growth and the unique cultural differences which will detennine the future 
progress in each country's T&A sectors. 
The specific textile and apparel items to be compared are based on the pre-2005 quota limits 
where Cltina were constrained. The full list of Cltinese products under quota control includes 77 
three digit T&A categories divided by fiber between fabric, textiles and apparel. The full set of 
Vietnamese products is far smaller. Since Vietnam was a relatively new start-up in the T&A sector 
there are only 20 three-digit categories which intersect with those of the PRC The full list is 
presented in Table 1. For this paper the review of Viemamese and Cltinese product competition is 
restricted to the smaller list based on actual Viemamese trade. 
The paper is divided into the following sections. The details of the post 199 5 agreement on 
textiles and clothing are presented in Section II. Section III presents the economic model for 
estimating the demand side competition between Cltina and Viemam. The results presented in that 
section include own- and cross- price elasticities across the subgroup of products where there is 
competition on the demand side. Section IV presents a comparison in the supply side responses 
between the Cltinese and Vietnamese T&A sectors. It is in this section that we try to isolate the 
cultural elements ingrained in the economic data. Concluding remarks are presented in Section V. 
The appendix describes the data sources. 
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11. THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING AND 
THEREAFTER 
The Agreement on Textiles and Oothing (ATC), like the original MFA, attempted to meet 
both the objectives of the developing country exporters and the developed country importers. As 
such, it inherited the same conflicting goals and implementation difficulties as were found in the first 
MF A For the exporters, the ATC was designed to eliminate quotas, thereby providing increased 
market access for textile and apparel exporters during the phase-out period, and integration of textile 
and apparel trade into the WfO regime, by the year 2005.2 From the importers perspective, the 
ATC was designed to provide stronger means of enforcement of quotas during the ten-year phase-
out period, and establish transitional safeguard measures for the temporary protection of domestic 
industries from increased imports. The implementing group established by the ATC to oversee the 
implementation of the agreement was the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). 
The heart of the ATC is contained in Article 2 which establishes the time frame for the ten-
year integration cycle by which quotas will be removed on 5.1% of textile and apparel products listed 
in the ATC Annex, maintaining for the tenth year, the balance - 49% of the items for integrations.' 
Products that are not integrated into the WTO during this ten-year phase-out period, and that are 
subject to quotas, are to have annual quota growth rates accelerated.' As the ten year phase-out 
period is completed, no planned extensions of the ATC were made.' 
2 While there is a commitment to eliminate quotas, the ATC does not make any commitment to reduce the extremely 
high tariffs currently in existence for both textile and apparel. 
3 ATC supra note 2, An. 2, ,, 6, 8. 
4 Id. An,2 , ,, 13-14 and 18. In the fmt 36 months from date of entry of the WfO, the increase in quota growth rate is 
set at 0.16 percent. Thereafter, it would be 025 percent from the 37"' month until the end of 84 months, and 027 
percent for the balance of the period. 
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In order to take into account the concerns of the developed country importers, Article 6 of 
the ATC provided a "transitional safeguard'' mechanism which allowed a country to take action to 
protect its textile and apparel industries if there was "serious damage" or the "actual threat thereof'' 
due to increased imports. This provision of the ATC was intended to be used "as sparingly as 
possible," and is not to be applied if the particular product to be restrained was already under 
restraint or if it fell in the current integration procedure prescribed by the ATC6 
Based on the US experience with requests for safeguards, there was no bright line standard 
for the complaints of either "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof." The evidence presented in 
the cases in front of the 1MB, to date, specified a whole list of factors such as changes in domestic 
output of the compering good, productivity, utilization of capacity, inventories, market share, 
exports, wages, employment, domestic prices, profits, and investment. According to Article 6, in 
order to invoke a transitional safeguard, the importing country must show that the damage to the 
industry was caused by "increased quantities in total imports of that product." The latter had to be 
targeted to a specific exporter. Damage due to changes in technology or consumer preference was 
not actionable under the provision.' 
5 Id. Art. 9. 
6 Id Art. 6,, 1. The ATCcalls fortransitional quotas to be applied on a country-by-country basis, Id. Art. 7. 
4 Furthermore, the ATC allows a safeguard to be placed on unfairly traded goods without requiring compensation to the 
restricted party, which was the practice under the earlier GATT rules. Unfairly traded goods are those tainted by 
dumping, government subsidies, or sellers' evasion of legitimate regulations regarding the environment, fair competition, 
intellectual property protection, etc. Additionally, the 1MB has primary responsibility of supervising transitional 
safeguard measures, Id. Art. 8, , 1. 
7 Article 6, ,, 1-4. The ATC specifies that a safeguard may be applied when it is demonstrated that serious damage 
exists and is demonstrably caused by imports. Furthermore, the evidence to be provided must be such as to show that 
there exists a "sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or imminent from a given exported and the level C?f 
imports as compared with impons from other sources, market share, and import and domestic prices at a comparable 
5 
In the spirit of enlarging the market for both new entrants and the least developed countries, 
Article 6, encouraged the differential treatment for this latter group when an importing country 
applied the transitional safeguards. Similarly, exporters whose total exports were small relative to 
the total volume of exports of others and who accounted for only a small percentage of total 
imports of that product into a particular importing market were afforded deferential and more 
favorable treatment in the application of safeguards. In adclition, developing country exporters of 
wool products were provided adclitional deference and special consideration when establishing quota 
levels, growth rates, and flexibility, if they could demonstrate that their economy was (1) dependent 
on the wool sector, (2) textile and clothing exports consisted almost exclusively of wool products; 
and (3) exports to the importing market were small relative to total imports in that market. 
Safeguards were not to be used at all on exports of handloom fabrics of the "cottage industry ... or 
traclitional folklore handicraft" products traded in commercially significant quantities prior to 1982, 
and all products made of pure silk. 8 
Apart from the special provisions listed, importing countries had significant control over the 
use of safeguards in that they could choose when to issue a "call" and could apply a unilateral 
restraint if consultations did not produce and agreement. The process usually began when an 
importing country requested a safeguard determination presented its case to both the exporting 
country and the 1MB. If the consultations produced an agreement on a restraint level, then a quota 
could be fixed at not less than the level of imports over the 12 months encling two months before 
the notification was issued. If there was no agreement within 60 days of the request for 
stage of commercial transaction. An imminent increase must be measurable and based on more than mere allegations, 
conjecture, or possibility. 
8 Art. 6, , 6{a)·6{d). The ATC does not specify what constitutes "significantly more favorable" treatment, nor does it 
define developing or least developed nations. Likewise, the ATC does not specify what it means by commercially 
significant. 
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consultations, the initiating country could apply a unilateral restraint. Safeguard measures could be 
maintained for up to three years without extension or until the product was integrated into the 
wro. If the restraint was in place for more than one year, the quota limit had to be increased at an 
annual rate of at least 6%, unless otherwise justified to the TMB.' 
The unilateral power of developed country importers to set safeguard quotas was designed 
to be checked by the TMB. It was the TMB which was empowered to review all safeguard actions. 
Even in cases where both sides had concluded a bilateral agreement, the TMB was empowered to 
detertnine whether the agreement was justified by the ATC. In cases where a safeguard was 
unilaterally imposed, the TMB was empowered to promptly conduct an examination of the matter 
and make appropriate recommendations within 30 days. If one or both of the parties did not accept 
the recommendations, the parties involved were to provide the TMB with its reasons within one 
month of receiving the recommendations. Following consideration of the reasons given, the TMB 
was to issue further recommendations. If the matter remained unresolved, either party could refer 
the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO and invoke Article XXIII of GATI 
and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.10 
The US has been the primary country to invoke the ATC safeguard clause. The United 
States issued 25 calls on WTO members during the first 20 months of the ATC. As noted in 
Pelzman and Rees (199S), the TMB did not disturb any bilateral settlements." In the six cases 
decided by the TMB, it decided in favor of the exporting country in two cases, in favor of the 
9 Art. 6, ,17·8, 10-13. 
10 Art. 6, ,,9.11 and Art. 8, ,, 5-7 and 9-10. 
11 World Trade Organization, Hearing Bt{are the House Way; and Means Omm, 104ili Cong., 2"d Sess. (1996). Between 9 
and 10 cases were referred to the TMB. 
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United States in one case, and reached no decision in three other cases. In all of these cases, the 
1MB did not find a case of "serious damage." 
In the case of China, the shift to a WTO norm in T&A does not make it free and clear of US 
protective measures. When the Chinese acceded to the wro they had to sign a separate bilateral 
l\1emorandum of Understanding which assured the U.S. of a unique bilateral consultation mechanism 
to remain in affect for four additional years beyond the end of quotas for the rest of the wro 
countries (through December 31, 2008).12 These more extensive "safeguard" measures between the 
US and China provides the US with rights to re-impose quotas under specified circumstances. This 
safeguard mechanism allows the U.S. to seek to extend quotas with China for specific goods where 
the elimination of such restrictions would result in " ... market disruption, threatening to impede the 
orderly development of trade between the two countries ... " 13 
This measure has been used, since 2003, four times by the United States. In 2003, three 
categories14 had one-year restraints placed on them. In 2004, one category underwent the same 
procedure and twelve categories were petitioned.15 In the first 6 months of 2005, ten categories have 
12 1he Memornndwn of Understancling regarcling China's accession to the WTO was signed on February 1, 1997. Listed 
under paragraph 242 of the Reporr of the Working Party on the Accession of China to the World Trade Organization 
(Accession Agreement), the United States (and any other WTO member country) is offered the right to institute a 
safeguard measure on textiles and apparel of Chinese origin that, due to a market disruptions, are threatening to impede 
the orderly development of trade. Proadures far Omsiderirrg RffJUfSts firm the Puldic far Textile arrl A ppard Sa[~ A ctions on 
Imports firm China, The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, Federal Register Vol. 68, No. 98, pg 
27787. Upon receipt if the request, China has agreed to hold its shipments to a level no greater than 7.5 percent ( 6 
percent for wool categories) .above the amount entered during the first 12 months of the most recent 14 months 
preceding the request for consultations. 
13 See United States International Trade Commission. 1999. A ssl5srrmt if theE ronomic E ffetts if Chim 5 A a:essron to the 
WTO. Investigation No. 332-403, Publication 3229. Washington, DC: USITC. 
14 Textiles and apparel are grouped into categories based on what product they are (i.e. wool socks, knit fabric, etc). 
These are given a three digit identification number that relates directly to the 10 digit harmonized tariff schedule of the 
United States. 
15 1he 12 cases had an injunction placed on them in the Court of International Trade that was lifted May 5, 2005. 
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been petitioned and now are open to public comment. The first category in 2003 to have restraints 
returned to it was Category 222: Knit Fabric. The United States established at 12 month limit on 
Chinese origin knit fabric not to exceed 9,664,477 kilograms. The reasons cited in this case became 
' 
the benchmark for all subsequent cases that came to the O>urt of International Trade. In this case, 
it was shown that U.S. imports from China were increasing in absolute terms, U.S. imports from 
China were increasing rapidly relative to other imports, the Chinese average unit vaJues were well 
below vaJues from other countries, U.S. imports from china were likely to increase greatly, and that 
the U.S. knit fabric industry was vulnerable to any increase in imports. Like knit fabric, the other 
categories in front of the O>urt of International Trade have been petitioned for harm to domestic 
industries or threat thereof. In 2004, Category 222 was petitioned again, but was grouped into the 
twelve cases under injunction. Like knit fabric, the other categories in front of the O>urt of 
International Trade have been petitioned for harm to domestic industries or threat thereof. Cross 
· Category 350/650, man-made fiber dressing gowns and robes, announced bilateral negotiations with 
China in 2003 for similar reasons to Category 222. U.S. imports from Cbina were increasing rapidly 
in absolute terms, U.S. imports from China were increasing rapidly relative to other imports, 
Chinese average unit values were well below average of other countries, U.S. imports from Cbina 
were likely to increase in the near future, and the industry was very vulnerable to any increase in 
unports. 
In 2005, the ten cases open for public comment, plus the twelve that were under injunction, 
were being petitioned for the same reasons. The O>urt of International Trade is now confronted 
with the option of potentially granting 22 safeguards on Chinese imports, or none at all. The court 
will review data presented to it in the same manner as before, along with the public comments that 
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are submitted, and make a decision based off of that information. However, the Office of Textiles 
and Apparel (OTEXA), OTA, and the Department of Commerce as a whole, now must decide how 
they will guide the future of Ollnese textile and apparel imports. The cases have taken on a broader 
role as indicators of trade measures and protectionist policy for the United States in regard to textile 
and apparel imports. It is important to note that the Court of International Trade has and will act, 
for as long as deemed necessary, as a mechanism to prevent rapid surges in textile and apparel 
imports from China. It is also likely that these cases and negotiations with Ollna will eventually 
result in a broader agreement, such as a voluntary export restraint, export taxes16, and more, that will 
be satisfactory for both the United States and the PRC. 
The US-Vietnam textile relationship is not as complicated as that between the United States 
and the PRC:, but it too was governed by a bilateral textile agreement. The Vietnamese agreement, 
however, was far shorter in duration. In fact, the US - Vietnam Bilateral Textile Agreement of July 
17, 2003, as amended on July 22, 2004, established quantitative limits on a very small number of 
items.17 Furthermore, the agreement had a built in 'dead-date' effective when Vietnam would enter 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Vietnam entered the WTO on January 11, 2007. 
Consequently, the quota period was changed to January 1 through January 10, 2007. All quota and 
visa requirements for goods exported from Vietnam on and after January 11, 2007, were eliminated. 
16 Export taxes are already utilized by the O!inese government. They were implemented on January 1, 2005 in order to 
set a price floor on textiles and apparel. Duties range from 0.2 to 0.5 yuan per piece and have been applied 148 tarilf 
lines, including the most sensitive categories such as coats, shirts, pajamas, etc. 
17 The bilateral agreement imposed limits on cenain cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles and textile products, 
produced or manufactured in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and exported during the period January 1, 2007 through 
December 31, 2007. See the Federal Register on December 22, 2006 (71 FR 76998), and amended in the docmnent 
published on December 29, 2006 (71 FR 78409). 
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Ill. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF QUOTA REMOVAL: 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A basic economic policy question involved in analysis of the impact of quota removal for 
imports from China and Vietnam is: How will the volume and composition of Chinese and 
Vietnamese exports to the United States change as a result of increased market access? To date what 
we have are projections all referring to expected Chinese domination and US litigation under the 
guise of market disruption. A recent WTO study (August 2004) predicted that China would increase 
its share of the U.S. textile market from 11 percent to 18 percent after quotas were eliminated, and 
would boost its apparel market share from 16 percent to 50 percent. While Vietnam is expected to 
expand its exports it was viewed as a minor player. The major difference is accounted for by the 
'newness' of Viemam as a T&A exporter, rather than institutional differences between the two 
countnes. 
Methodological !ss ues: 
The most important characteristic of textile and apparel quota system was that it was an ex-
post set of trade restrictions imposed on a subset of developing countries on a subset of three-digit 
T & A categories which were fiber based with room to borrow across categories and time. These 
restrictions, while binding in most cases, created a rent seeking cycle for exporting producers who 
take advantage of the restrictions and the accompanying quota licenses. It also encouraged 
upgrading and a shift of domestic resources to a set of products whose sales are pre-determined. In 
many cases both the domestic competition in importing countries and the exporters in developing 
countries shared the benefits of higher prices. 
The controlled markets for a specific T & A category can be seen in Figure 1. The 
introduction of a quota limit turns the supply curve to a perfectly inelastic portion. 
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Figure 1: Controlled Market 
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The quota free equilibrium occurs at point A, where the import price is tariff inclusive. Equilibrium 
at point B is after the imposition of the quota. The price gap is the effective quota rent that will be 
removed with the demise of the MFA Tariffs are unaffected by the new trading regime. 
With all other things held constant, an elimination of the quotas on T & A imported from 
Ollna and Vietnam would cause US imports to increase as US buyers substitute the now lower-
priced uncontrolled foreign goods for US substitutes (trade creation) or US imports from other 
countries (trade diversion). The total expansion of US imports from either Ollna or Vietnam would 
be the sum of the trade creation and trade diversion effects. Since our concern, on the demand side, 
lies in determining changes in Vietnamese or Ollnese dollar earnings resulting from expanded 
exports to the United States, total trade expansion (or gross trade creation) will be measured. 
The partial equilibrium approach mentioned above can be described by a system of demand 
and supply equations for the two beneficiary countries and the United States. Let the United States 
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be denoted as country i and are two beneficiary countries as j, where j ~ 1,2. Then a series of 






where M is the quantiry of US imports, X is the quantiry of beneficiary country exports, P,~ is the 
domestic US price for commodity k, P)[ is the world market price assumed to be the price at which 
Vietnam and Ollna export to the United States, t is one plus the ad-valorem MFN duty rate (1) 
applied by the United States, 8 is one plus the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of the quota estimated by 
the price gap in figure 1, and R is the beneficiary country's export revenue on products exported 
into the United States. 
Totally differentiating equations (1) through (5) and solving for the proportional changes in 
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(8) 
where ">1 is the relative price elasticity of import demand, e is the export supply elasticity, and ' 
denotes percent change. 
Within this partial equilibrium framework, export flows, import flows, and export revenues 
are each a function of the percentage change in relative prices due to the elimination of quotas and 
the elasticities of import demand and export supply. From the perspective of Vietnam and Cl!ina, as 
long as the US import demand is elastic, each country will gain if their products are sufficiently 
differentiated and their export supply elasticity is infinite. In the event that their supply elasticity was 
zero, each exporting country suppliers would simply receive the amount of the quota rent as added 
profit. 
In order to derive empirical estimates of the effects of MF A elimination on these two 
beneficiary country exporters using the model described above, several things would be needed. To 
determine the responsiveness of U.S. buyers and Vietnamese and Cl!inese sellers to removal of the 
quota premiums on goods imported from these countries, reliable estimates of U.S. import demand 
and Vietnamese and Cl!inese export supply elasticities would be required. In adclition, it would be 
necessary to make assumptions about the potential price response by Vietnamese and Cl!inese 
exporters to a change in U.S. import quota equivalent duties. If the inclividual country suppliers 
perceive the market as being less than competitive, then they may pass through all, some, or none of 
the duty equivalent reduction to U.S. buyers by maintaining export prices unchanged, raising them 
by a fraction of the tariff equivalent of the quota elimination, or raising them by the full amount of 
the quota rent. In sum, an estimate of the total trade expansion will depend on the U.S. import 
demand elasticity, the export supply elasticity and pricing strategy of the two beneficiaries, the 
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magnitude of the change in U.S. tariffs equivalents of the quota, and the current volume of U.S. 
imports from the region. 
Using the detailed three-digit textile category data covering the 1995-2004 period for 20 
categories where Cbina and Vietnam compete we first proceed to estimate the import demand 
equations for Olina and Viemam. In this way we estimate the own price elasticities of demand, the 
cross price elasticities for Viemam's competition with O!ina, and that of the aggregate uncontrolled 
market. Estimates of Cbinese and Vietnamese supply elasticities are not estimated but are relegated 
to a discussion of each country's T&A sectors and the applicable institutional and cultural factors. 
The relative sensitivity of equation (8) to the elasticities used can be seen from the following 
scenarios of changes in exporters' revenues that nlight occur for different magnitudes of the demand 
and supply elasticities: 
Supply Elasticities (e) 
Demand 
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It should be clear, therefore, that a slight modification in the elasticities will bring about a major 
change in the estimated results. 
Empirical estimation: 
In order to address the question of competition between Ollna and Viemam we first have to 
establish that on the demand side their T & A products are either compliments or substitutes. In order 
to accomplish this we estimate an import demand equation for each of the three-digit T & A categories 
for Ollna and for Vietnam. Each of the demand equations is specified as a function of its specific 
market price, the price of an identical three digital category from the alternative market, the world 
uncontrolled market price, the domestic price of a competing good, and a real activity variable, or 
(9) 
where M ~ quantity of import demand for commodity j from i (Ollna or Viemam); P q ~ import price 
from Ollna; PVi ~ import price from Viemam; Pw,. ~average uncontrolled world market price of 
imports; P o; ~ domestic price of the competing product; E ~ real activity variable; and fl ~ random 
error tenn. Since there are two differentiated regions, there are two import demand equations that 
depend on all three prices over time. 
This Armington (1969) specification of the import demand equations requires the following set 
of assumptions. First, it is necessary for these import demand equations. to be weakly separable 
between textile and apparel products and other products which enter the consumer's utility function. In 
effect, each of our products is treated as a distinct good with imperfect substitutes differentiated by 
country of origin. Second, Armington's two step process assumes that the marginal rate of substitution 
for any two products (differentiated by source) is independent of the quantities demanded of third 
goods entering the consumer's utility function. This assumption of a zero income compensated cross 
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price effect between textile and apparel goods and thin:l goods. It means that a change in the price of 
this thin:l good will have an impact on the demand for textile and apparel imports, but only when it has 
an impact on real expenditures. The restrictive nature of this assumption, if violated, may result in a 
misspecification bias in our estimated import demand equations." 
While Armington's assumptions may be reasonable for textile and apparel end products, they 
may present a problem for some of the intermediate textile products. In the case of intermediate 
imports, such as y.un and fabric, the import demand equations noted by equation (5) are, in fact, 
derived demand functions. The assumption of independence between the marginal rates of substitution 
of different classes of intermediate inputs, such as man-made fibers for carton or vegetable fibers for 
both may represent a problem In these latter cases the import demand equations will include the prices 
of all possible substitutes. Omission of these prices clearly will cause the import demand equations for 
the intermediate textile imports to be misspecified. 
Table 2 presents the GLS estimates for US import demand of T&A products from Viemam 
The overall conclusion that one can draw from these results is that out of a total of 20 three digit 
categories where competition is possible, there are only five categories where the cross price elasticity of 
a change in PRCs prices on US imports from Viemam is significantly different from zero. In category 
335, women and girl cotton coats, for every 1 percent increase in China's price US imports from 
Viemam would rise by 23.2 percent, a substitute product; in category 34 7, men and boys cotton 
trousers and shorts, for every 1 percent increase in China's price US imports from Viemam would rise 
by 6.12 percent, a substitute product; in category 635,women and girls man-made fiber coats, for every 
1 percent increase in China's price US imports from Viemam would rise by 8.29 percent, suggesting a 
substitute product; in category 636, man-made fiber dresses, for every 1 percent increase in China's 
18 For a discussion of the theoretical implications of the weak separability assumption, see Wmters ( 19 84). 
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price US imports from Vietnam would rise by 6.66 percent, suggesting a substitute product; and in 
category 651, MMF night ware and pajamas, for every 1 percent increase in China's price US imports 
from Vietnam would rise by 15.7 percent, suggesting a substitute product. 
Overall, these results confirm the hypothesis found in the industry that China and Vietnam 
currently have a very limited area for direct competition. When one digs deeper into the trade and price 
data, one obseJVes that US imports from China tend to be more expensive than comparable three-digit 
T&A categories from Vietnam The key question is the long term impact of continued hberalization in 
Vietnam as it affects the T&A sector. 
IV. THE SUPPLY SIDE RESPONSE IN TEXTILES AND APPAREL: 
ECONOMICS&CULTURE 
During the long history of the MFA, the search for low wage producers was a key 
explanatory variable for the world's distribution of quotas. In the past decade, this has changed 
drastically. The primary ingredient for a successful T & A sector is quick turnaround time for 
apparel and economies of scale for textiles. In the apparel segment of the industry, which is 
considered by many to be fashion-oriented, time sensitivity is even more cruciaL While the low-
wage sewing provides some competitive advantages to developing COlll}tries, it is only applicable to 
the assembly process of low end garments and does not necessarily lead to the development of a 
sophisticated T&A sector. Cbina, which represents the higher end T&A industry, has managed to 
combine its export-led strategy in T&A with the development of higher value-added segments of the 
supply chain. This was achieved by integrating scale economies with diversification of its labor pool, 
upgrading domestic skills in local design, material sourcing, quality control, logistics and retail 
distribution. 
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The industries in each country are affected by the culture of that country because culture 
impacts how people think and react. There is also evidence that culture influences foreign trade 
(Guo, 2004). The T&A industries in GUna and Vietnam are no different. We will present the main 
culture factors that eau explain the differences in the supply chain between GUna and Vietnam in 
the T&A industry. The first major research study on national cultural differences was published by 
Hofstede (1980; 1983). It is based on research conducted on IBM personnel from 50 countries, 
using 116,000 questionnaires. The questions regarding employee values demonstrated the 
differences among countries in four cultural dimensions: Power Distance Index (PDI), 
Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MAS) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). Hofstede and Bond 
(1984; 1988) discovered a fifth dimension, named Long-Term Orientation (LTO). Hofstede's culture 
dimension are still a key layer in culture evaluations and empirical tests (Crotts and Erdmann 2000; 
Downey et al. 2005; Dwyer et al. 2005).Hofstede measures continue to enjoy strong support among 
researchers (Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001) and serve as a de facto set of benchmark measures. 
TO BE ADDED 
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In descnbing the supply side responses of Viemam and China resulting from the elimination 
of quotas, one needs to appreciate the fact that what is called the T&A sector is composed of a 
chain of separable activities. This linear chain of production functions stans with agriculture where 
we have the initial fiber stage. 
Cotton Fiber 
Textiles are produced by both natural and man-made fibers. In the natural fiber side, a 
country's potential comparative advantage is affected by the traditional factor endowment 
availabilities, e.g. land, climate, and by domestic internal subsidy programs, e.g. cotton. In the 
synthetic fiber area, the industry is a derivate of chemical producers. Economies of scale in this 
sector have traditionally benefited the developed countries. 
In the case of China, cotton is regarded as a "strategic" commodity.19 Consequently, every 
aspect of cotton from production, internal and external sales, and firm consumption are part of a 
complex set of State interventions. Despite China's openness with respect to international trade, the 
central government had until 1998, determined cotton's procurement prices and resale prices and 
established a State monopsony/monopoly (the Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (SMCs)) as the 
sole agent for purchasing cotton from the rural sector. From 1985 to 1998, cotton farmers where 
obligated under a production "contract'' to supply the SMC with a certain quantity of cotton at the 
planned procurement price; they could also sell any above· quota quantity of cotton to the SMC 
The introduction of market reform, decentralized purchases and direct links between producers and 
consumers of cotton did not begin in earnest till the late 1990s. 
19 For a detailed discussion of the Ouna's domestic and international policies with respect to Cotton, See OECD (2005). 
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Beginning in 1996, SMCs were allowed to trade cotton directly with local textile mills. 1his 
decentralized linkage system still had a local constraint in that the tradable quantities were still bound 
by assigned quotas for importing and exporting regions. Funhermore, the definition of a market price 
actually meant that the two parries to a trade were allowed to decide the terms of trade within a very limited 
price band of ±4% of the state. set cotton allocation price. 
As of September 1999, cotton prices in China are to be determined by market forces, while 
the government issued a minimum price at the end of the year. These minimum prices serve as 
purchase prices for the SMCs, who as of 1999 no longer have exclusive rights to purchase cotton 
from producers, but do purchase stocks of cotton for special reserve holdings by the State. These 
reserves along with rules for international purchases of cotton are designed to stabilize local cotton 
prices, the major mput into the textile industry. 
The role of the State is very much part of China's external arrangement with respect to 
cotton, as well. Trade in cotton, despite China's accession to the WTO is still dominated by a State 
Owned Entetprise (SOE) · China National Textiles Import and Export Company (Chinatex.). As 
pan of the wro accession process China introduced a tariff rate quota system where there was an 
in·quota tariff of 3% and an over·quota tariff of 90%. This distortion combined with the role of 
SOEs as purchasing agents guarantees a limited role for international market prices to affect the 
local cotton industry. This may change as China begins to reduce the role of SOEs to a third of the 
volume of trade. 
There is no countetpart in Vietnam. Fiber production is minintal, with most of the inputs 
coming from abroad. 
In the fiber spinning segment the Vietnamese industry in the late 80s, had 860,000 spindles 
and 2,000 spinning rotors without spindles belonging to 13 SOEs. The annual output at that time 
was 60,000 ton with average Nm index of 40. Most of these spindles had been used for over 10. 
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years by that time and they were under the need of renewing. By the year 1996, the industry had 
800,124 spindles and 3,520 rotors. Among those spindles, 90,600 were new (about 11.32% of tota~ 
of which 55,960 spindles were replaced by West European second hand equipment (7.0% of tota~, 
107,000 spindles were upgraded (13.4% of tota~. The production capacity increased by 72,000-ton 
of fibers per year. Average Nmindexes is 61. (VINA1EX). 
For the shuttle weaving segment the Vietnamese industry had 10,500 weaving machines (by 
1996). The newly imported machines accounted for 15%. The share of machines that could be 
restored is 45%. The rest were in need of selling off. Central SOEs owned 7,973 units, and among 
those units' modem, the number of weaving machines was 978 or 12.26%. To that date, a half of 
total weaving machines of textile industry was too old and unable to run. For example, in the North, 
approximately 5,000 units (made in China) were dated back to 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. In the 
South, a part of the old textile equipment is ones that were imported from Japan, USA, Korea in the 
period 1960-1974 (VINA1EX). 
For knitted weaving the problem for Vietnam was the vintage of the capital stock. The 
technologies of knitting industry are relatively more modern than other textile technologies. Most of 
out-of-date machines that were imported before 1986 from China, Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany were liquidated or transferred to localities and all machines in use now are ones that were 
imported after 1996. The new equipment was imported mostly from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 
Germany. Thirty percent of these capital machines are of new generation with some being 
controlled by computer, and the rest are of older ages and less advanced. Because of low quality of 
cotton fiber, almost all enteiprises have chosen production plan using Pe/ Co fiber to produce 
simple consumer goods such as mosquito net, valise fabrics, not to produce decorated cloth, carpet, 
cloth for construction and the like. 
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For the dyeing and printing segment, all the dyeing, printing and finishing equipment was 
imported from abroad and belong to SOEs. At present, 35% of dyeing and printing equipment in 
the industry have been imported since 1986 (about 400 units). All of them are equipment of A2, A3 
generations and still operating well 30% of dyeing and printing equipment were imported in the 
period 1970- 1985. This equipment is in need of repair for further use. The rest were imported in 
the period 1959- 1969. This equipment should be scrapped gradually (VINATEX). 
Textiles 
The textile mill products sector of the textile industry includes all operations that are 
involved in converting fiber to finished fabric and the production of many non-apparel consumer 
products. Technological innovations have greatly increased the speed of operations and resulted in 
huge productivity gains. Traditionally the developed countries have innovated more in this segment 
of the industry, Olina has not lagged far behind. However, non-clothing applications of textiles -
the so-called "technical textiles" - are now more important than clothing applications and account for the 
fastest-growing segment of total textile production in developed countries. 
It is generally understood that in markets like the United States, the textiles sector makes 
fabric in three steps that are often made by different factories. The first step is spinning fibers into 
thread or yam, the second is weaving or knitting thread or yam into fabrics and the third is chemical 
processing to finish the fabric. In addition, there are non-woven fabrics that are produced by 
mechanically, thermally or chemically bonding or interlocking fibers, filaments or yams. These 
processes in the United States are highly capital-intensive and are subject to economies of scale?0 
Having said that, we still have in many developing countries, textile industries that are utilizing very 
20 See Pelzman and Manin (1981) where estimates of textile and apparel production functions are presented. 
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simple technology within the household or in micro-enterprises. In the new quota free world, these 
latter small-scale producers are destined to expire. 
Mter Ollna initially received MFN status in the US in 1979 a whole set of domestic reforms 
were initiated to induce domestic Ollnese producers to enter the global market. These incentives 
were not only important for the success of China in the textile industry it also introduced new forms 
of corporate governance which has enabled Ollna to compete in the Textile sector with developed 
countries like the United States. The primary institutional shift was a set of reforms that allowed the 
rural companies to form alliances with the State-owned enterprises (SOEs), enabling the new 
corporate form to take advantage of a merger of cheap rurallabor with high investments in new 
technology in the textile industry SOEs. 
According to the OECD, the textile and apparel sector continues to receive a sizeable share 
of total state subsidies from the central government. It is estimated that the percentage of the total 
subsidies that the central government granted to textile SOEs rose from 1.61 %in 1990 to 20.57% 
in 1998. Ollna's central government intervention in the Textile industry does not depend only on 
price incentives. It also involves setting performance targets. In order to appreciate the importance 
of Central Planning to the development of this industry one need only review the goals established 
for textiles in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2000-05) seeking to upgrade the value added of textiles. 
The following goals were contained in the Tenth Five-Year Plan for 2000-2005?1 
1. Increasing the value added of the sector from 267.8 billion Yuan in 2000 to 430 billion Yuan 
in 2005, or an increase of 60.6 %. 
2. Increasing the production volume of textile fiber from 12.1 million tons in 2000 to 14.25 
million tons in 2005, and increasing the apparent consumption per person from 6.6 kgs. to 
7.4 kgs. forthe same period. 
21 See USITC. 2004 .. 
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3. Increasing exports from 52 billion dollars .in 2000 to between 70 and 75 billion dollars in 
2005. 
4. Increasing labor productivity from 25,000 Yuan per worker in 2000 to 35,000 Yuan in 2005. 
5. Reducing energy consumption for every 10,000 Yuan of production by 15 %. 
6. Using recycled water in production for 30 % of current consumption by 2005; in the prints 
sector, reducing water consumption for every 100 meters from 3.6 tons to 3.0 tons. 
In order to reach the goals that have been set, the Chinese government provided a stable 
area for growing cotton. It guaranteed the textile industry that it would supply 4.5 million tons of 
cotton annually. It provided incentives for technological progress by fomenting alliances between 
companies and research centers and establishing development centers for the large SOEs. 
According to the USITC, the Chinese Textile industtyin 2000, had 18,900 SOEs with a sales 
volume higher than 5 million Yuan; with total assets of 977,300 million Yuan, which generated tax 
revenue of 267,800 million Yuan in value added taxes and which represented 11.9 %, 8.3 % and 11.3 
%, respectively, of the entire manufacturing industry. Employment in Textiles was around 13 
milli 22 on. 
Since the mid 1990's China accounts for more than 25 % of the global spinning machines 
(USITC 1999).23 This share has increased substantially in the past ten years. Furthermore, the 
industry has created both forward and backward linkages integrating a large number of production 
segments namely, cotton and other fibers; accessories; thread, yam, and textile manufacturing; and 
the processing of these products into garments, rugs, and industrial textiles (USITC 2004). China 
now has the national and global supply and input companies necessary to make almost all products. 
22 Ibid., The total workers. in Textiles and apparel has been estimated by the ILO to be 19 million or approximately 22 
percent of all manufacturing sector employment. According to the ILO another 80 million people are directly linked to 
this combined sector. The numberof Apparel companies are estimated to be 40,000 of which only 6 percent are SOEs. 
We do not have current estimates of apparel sector employment. 
23 !bid, In 2002 China had around 22.8 % of all spinning machines and had acquired more than 50 percent of them 
during 2000-2002. 
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During the past two decades Orina developed a highly competitive maritime transportation system, 
ensuring that its products arrive on the East Coast of the United States between 12 and 18 days 
from boarding, while its competitors may take three times as long to arrive. (USITC 2004). 
The Vietnamese textile industry is despite its reorganization is predominantly a state sector 
operator. State owned corporations takes a lion share of total output, at around 53% on average in 
the late 1990s. Most of textile output of state sector have been produced by central SOEs (80% on 
average) and this share has been rising in recent years, as local SOEs have been facing difficulties 
due to the capital shortage. The key cost advantage found in Vietnam's textile industry is the hourly 
cost of labor. According to an industry source, in 2002, Vietnam's hourly wage in textiles was .27 
US dollars as compared to China's wage of .69 US dollars.24 Despite what appeared as general 
economy wide reforms, in the T&A industry in Vietnam, the majority of state firms have become 
members of T&A Corporation named VINATEX. At present, VINATEX has 52 member-
enterprises and takes a large share of this industry. It is estimated that VINA TEX produces 80% of 
total fiber, 65% of fabrics and 45% of garment products and shares 40% of total export value of this 
industry. Although the member enterprises of VINATEX can work independently, VINATEX 
plays an important role in export quota allocation and allocation of state and bank credits to its 
member enterprises. 
If one were to set up a cultural variable to explain the difference in Orina's government and 
that of Vietnam in this area it would be the degree of democratization and constituency politics. 
Vietnam is still undergoing some basic industrial reorganizations away from SOEs. Orina on the 
other hand, has a Centralized government with market orientation. It can transfer long-term views 
to its public without having to meet short-term demands from competing constituencies. The latter 
can therefore focus better on export-led growth policies with an expectation that welfare 
24 See Gherzi et. al. (2002). 
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improvements will eventually confirm this economic direction. In the case of Ollna the end result 
has justified the 20 year investment in export led growth. 
In Vietnam's textile industry, primte sector grew quite rapidly up until1996, but slowed down 
since then. Even in the years of high growth rate, share of formal private sector in the textile 
industry was modest with peaks of 2.1% in 1996 and 1997. In general, GDP share of the private 
sector in the textile industry is smaller than its share in the whole industry (2.1% vs. 3.38%), but 
both indicate that private sector is under-developed." 
The late 1990s witnessed a large reduction of output shares of two sectors: cmperatim and 
househdd enterprisfS. Household and collective (cooperatives) sectors notmally produce traditional 
products targeting low-income consumers. These sectors face fierce competition from large-scale 
enterprises and foreign made goods. Cooperatives are a legacy of the centralized economy, and 
although it was important in the past, it is now almost non-existent with share out of total industry 
output shrinking from 2% in 1995 to about 1% in 1998. The decline of the collective sector is due to 
the withdrawal of government assistance, which was common in the past, and to poor economic 
management, which was largely due to low motivation of managers caused by improperly designed 
incentive system. Share of household enterprises have been in downward trend too, but the decline 
was smaller as compared to the collective sector. The sector's output share in the industry dropped 
significantly from 22% in 1995 to 15% in 1999. The decline of the household sector in relative terms 
is mainly explained by the expansion of the formal sector, and to a lesser extent, reduction of the 
sector in absolute terms as evidenced by a reduction of total employment of this sector from 552 
thousand people in 1993 to 539 thousand people in 1998?6 




The global apparel industry has evolved substantially from its earliest form where the 
industry in the developing countries acted like subcontractors, where garment were sewn from 
imported inputs ready for assembly. In the current market these operations are still found in simple 
non-competitive producers of homogenous apparel tterns. Slightly more sophisticated ts a 
subcontracting process most commonly as original equipment manufacturing (OEM). The 
characteristics of this outsourcing operation include the supplying firm making a product according 
to a design specified by the buyer; the product is sold under the buyer's brand name; the supplier 
and buyer are separate firms; and the buyer lacks control over distribution. The most sophisticated 
upgrading of this outsourcing process is commonly referred to as Original brand name 
manufacturing (OBM) where the developing country apparel manufacturer begins to design their 
ov,n end product and then sell it under their own brand name. 
The critical element in the apparel chain is therefore the retailer. In the United States at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the five largest retail chains represented 45 percent of the apparel market. By 
1995, these five largest retailers-Wal-Mart, Sears, Kmart, Dayton Hudson Corporation and JC 
Penney-accounted for 68 per cent of all apparel sales. The next top 24 retailers, represented an 
additional 30 per cent of these sales. The two top discount giants, Wal-Mart and Kman, control 
one quarter of all apparel (in terms of unit sold) sold in the United States. By 2000, only 10 percent 
of the apparel sold by these chains was of US origin. These retailers' overseas are no longer just 
facilitating the transfer of apparel to the US market, they are actively engaged in product design, 
fabric selection and procurement, and monitoring contracted sewing as well as other production 
functions handled by offshore manufacturers. Another new development is the growth of private-
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label goods, which have been estimated to cover up to 25 per cent of the United States apparel 
market in 2000. 
As a result of these linkages and the new practice in the US of reducing inventory costs, time 
factors play a far more crucial role in determining international competitiveness. With the removal 
of the quota system, low-wage countries like Vietnam that had depended on being an offshore 
assembly centers owing to their quota allocations will find itself vulnerable because of the inherent 
cost disadvantage of their business model based on production fragmentation. Time factors can be 
an important trade barrier for intermediary inputs involved in an internationally fragmented 
production process. 
The emergence of more competitive and integrated suppliers in China who will now increase 
their sales in a quota free world, will exert considerable pressure on fragmented suppliers like 
Vietnam.27 The comparative advantage of Vietnam in the assembly process, i.e. in low-wage sewing, 
does not necessarily translate into a comparative advantage in the management of the entire supply 
chain when all services-related dimensions are taken into consideration. Efficiency in managing the 
entire supply chain is required, including in design, fabric procurement, and logistical skills in 
transport, quality control, export financing and clearing of trade formalities. The latter has become 
more of the Chinese modeF8 
27 As wages in China keep rising they are taking advantage of their upscale production and marketing skills and have 
implemented a number of preferential policies in order to encourage its T & A manufacturers to invest more in other 
developing countries. These measures include preferential loans, simplified administrative procedures, and enhanced 
inforrmi.tion and intelligence support. Ollna appears to be entering this new market in order to subcontract its apparel 
production. China's current focus is on Africa where they have started discussions with Morocco and in Asia with 
Bangladesh. 
28 China has made great strides in the Apparel sector. Output in the sector rose by 37 percent from 1995 to 1999, while 
industry employment fell by 27 percent. See UN (2002). China's increase in its apparel quality and productivity comes at 
the same time that it has accepted the necessity to import its better quality textiles from abroad. Eighty percent of 
Japan's import apparel is currently of Chinese country of origin. Achieving such a high penetration rate is proof that 
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In Viemam, the role of non-state sector in the apparel indusuy is still modest. One of the 
reasons is the capital shortage experienced by non-state firms. A more important reason is the lack 
of favorable environment for non-state firms to flourish. Private firms often complain about the 
complicated registration procedures", difficult access to land, credit and quota. Unfavorable 
business environment has had its negative impact not only on private firms, but also on cooperatives 
and household enterprises. As a consequence, these sectors have gone down over the past few years. 
Too small scale of non-state firms is also widely perceived as a cause of their poor performance and 
their disadvantage vis-a-vis SOEs and foreign invested firms. Also, as the economy develops and 
people's income increases, apparel consumption bends towards ready-made clothing which is 
normally better produced in larger enterprises. 
Vietnam is unlikely to have comparative advantage in up-stream and some mid-stream 
sectors, since these sectors are relatively capital-intensive while capital is a scarce factor in Vietnam 
at this stage of development. In fact, those sectors that produce fibers or fabric of high quality are 
almost non-existent in Vietnam, and the country therefore still heavily relies on imported fabrics. 
That translates to a focus on the apparel sub-contractors as Vietnam's comparative advantage. 
A distinctive feature of Vietnam's textile indusuy is that while the vertical linkage between 
up and down streams is weak, mixed production is relatively common in which textile firms produce 
both textile and garment items. Some textile firms have recently introduced clothing production in 
their business. The primary reasons is the existence of excessive labor and the desire to add value to 
some textile products by shifting downwards to apparel production lines. Firms that succeed in this 
Ollnese Apparel can compete at the highest qUality end. Ollna is the benchmark that Vietnam will have to measure 
itself to. 
29 The year2000 witnessed a new trend in development of the private sector in Vietnam including both formal and 
informal firms. The number of new establishments was about 30% of total existing private firms atthe end of 1999. 
This improvement is largely explained by the introduction and implementation of Enterprise Law and the progress of 
administration reform. See note 25 above. 
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are nonnallythose that have access to export quotas for their garment products. In other words, an 
important motive for having garment production lines in textile finns is to take the advantage of 
their access to export. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With the unprecedented act removing T&A quotas the developing countries of Asia have 
been thrown into of an uncomfortable position of having to compete for market shares .. Even more 
disttnbing is the fact that low wages will not guarantee these countries a market in the United States. 
The big player that have been identified as major potential winner of this new shift in trade controls 
is Ouna. This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by approaching the problem by a 
partial equilibrium review of each beneficiaries' potential demand side competitiveness with respect 
to each other, the supply side responses and the differing objective functions of the state and 
business community which are taken as representative of cultural differences. 
On the demand side, we found strong competition between Ollna and Vietnam in a very 
linllted number of items. In the majority of three-digit categories bound for the PRC there was no 
significant cross-price elasticity of demand. The reality behind the regression results was that the 
quality of Ollnese textile and apparel products drastically improved while Vietnam has only a single 
cost factor. Vietnam's T&A industry is still in early stage of development, and therefore it mainly 
exploits comparative advantage based on cheap labor. The share of labor cost in total value added of 
Vietnam's T&A industry is lower than in other countries. The lower ratio of labor share in total 
value added could be explained by low relative price of labor over capital in Vietnam, which is much 
lower than in some other countries. This indicates the scarcity of capital in Vietnam as compared to 
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other countries. Within one country, share of labor in total value added of textile industry is lower 
than that of apparel industry, as textile industry is more capital intensive than garment industry. 
When we reviewed the supply side, it was apparent that the single most important systemic 
difference which can be attributed to cultural differences was the reliance in Ollna on the central 
planning to organize the development path of the entire T&A industry. It was the State that 
encouraged major technological changes, a search for economies of scale and a shift from merely 
producing as sub-contractors to developing a unique fashion and downstream linkages mechanism. 
Viemam is still in its early stage to follow the PRC model. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Trade Data: The textile trade data, in terms of value and quantity, are based on the three digit textile 
category system. This data was for the time period 1995-2004 and was provided by the U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce. Office of Textiles and Apparel. (01EXA). 
Prices: Domestic producer prices were matched to the textile category level. when possible. In cases 
where a clear concordance was not possible, the more aggregate WPI for the aggregate Textiles and/ or 
Apparel was used. Import prices both for China, Vietnam and the uncontrolled country suppliers were 
based on unit values. 
Tariffs: Ad-valorem tariff equivalents were calculated at the three digit textile category level for the 
entire 1995-2004 period and was provided by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Office of Textiles and 
Apparel. (01EXA). 
Activity Variables: Based on the nature of the commodity in question a number of activity variables 
were used. In all cases an effort was made to make a distinction between end products and intermediate 
goods. The list of activity variables includes: 
(1) Retail sales of apparel and accessory stores; 
(2) Total personal consumption expenditures; 
(3) Personal consumption expenditure for non-durables; 
( 4) Personal consumption expenditure for clothing and shoes; 
(5) Personal consumption expenditure for clothing; 
Output: Domestic output measured at the three digit textile category level was provided by the U.S. 
Dept. of Commerce. Office of Textiles and AppareL (01EXA). 
Quota Levels: Quota levels by Country/Product were provided by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Office 
of Textiles and Apparel. (01EXA). These limits have been corrected for the periodic borrowing and 
lending over categories and titne. The restrictions used, therefore, present a true upper limit as exercised 
by the U.S. Government. 
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Table 1 
Textile Category Description 
CAT DESCRIPTION UNIT 
218FABRICS OF YARNS OF DIFF. COLORS :M2 
219DUCKFABRIC :M2 
220FABRICOFSPEOAL WEAVE :M2 
222KNITFABRIC KG 
224PILE / TIJF1ED FABRICS :M2 
225BLUE DENIM FABRIC :M2 
226GffiESECL01H, BATIS1ES, LAWNS/VOILE :M2 
2270XFORD CL01H :M2 
237PLAYSUITS, SUNSUITS, ETC Doz 
300CARDED COTTON YARN KG 
301 COMBED COTTONY ARN KG 
313COTTONSHEETINGFABRIC :M2 
314COTTON POPLIN/ BROADCL01H F AB. :M2 
315COTTON PRINTCL01H FABRIC :M2 
317COTTONTWILLFABRIC :M2 
326COTTON SA1EEN FABRIC :M2 
331COTTON GLOVES AND MITTENS DPR 
333M/B SUIT-TYPE COATS, COTTON Doz 
33401HERM/B COATS, COTTON Doz 
335W/GCOTTON COATS Doz 
336COTTON DRESSES Doz 
340M/B COTTON SHIRTS, NOT KNIT Doz 
341W/GCOT. SHIRTS/BLOUSES,N-KNIT Doz 
342COTTON SKIRTS Doz 
345COTTON SWEA1ERS Doz 
347M/B COT. TROUSERS/BREECHES/SHORTS Doz 
348W/G COTTON TROUSERS/SLACKS/SHORTS Doz 
351COTTONNIGHIWEAR/PAJAMAS Doz 
352COTTON UNDERWEAR Doz 
360COTTON PILLOWCASES Doz 
361COTTONSHEETS Doz 
363COTTON1ERRY I 01HERPILE TOWELS No 
613JVIMF SHEETING FABRIC :M2 
614JVIMF POPLIN I BROADCL01H FABRIC :M2 
38 
615MMF PRINTCL01H FABRIC 
617MMF TWILL AND SA1EEN FABRIC 
:M2 
:M2 
619POL YES1ER FILAMENT FABRIC, LIGHT-WEIGHT:M2 
62001HERSYNTIIETICFILAMENfFABRIC :M2. 
625MMF POPLIN/BROADCL 1H STAP /FIL :M2 
628MMF TWILLS/SA1EENS STAP/FIL :M2 
62901HERMMF FABRICS OF STAP/FIL :M2 
63401HERM/BMMFCOA1S Doz 
635W/GMMFCOATS Doz 
636MMF DRESSES Doz 
638M/B MMF KNIT SHIRTS Doz 
639W/G MMF KNIT SHIRTS I BLOUSES Doz 
640M/B NOT-KNIT MMF SHIRTS Doz 
641W/G NOT-KNIT MMF SHIRTS I BLOUSES Doz 
642MMF SKIR1S Doz 
643M/B MMF SUI1S Doz 
644W/GMMFSUI1S Doz 
645M/B MMF SWEA1ERS Doz 
646W/GMMFSWEA1ERS Doz 
647M/B MMF 1ROUSERS/BREECHES/SHOR1S Doz 
648W/GMMF SLACKS/BREECHES/SHORTS Doz 
651MMF NIGHTWEAR/ PAJAMAS Doz 
652MMF UNDERWEAR Doz 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel. 
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Table 2 
GLS Estimates of US Import's from Vietnam 
Demand Equations 
IZ Vietnamese Chinese Chinese RPCE PPI F-statistic Adjusted Price Price Relative Elasticity Elasticity (p-VALUE) R' Elasticity Elasticity Quota I t Elasticity 
237 -0.15 0.92 5.95* -1.29 -81.9 4.28 (0.09) 0.64 
331 -0.18 2.38 -0.5 2.5 -19 5.8 {0.05) 0.72 
335 3.73* 23.2* 5.38* 22.9** -31 * 8.5 {0.029) 0.8 
336 -4.24 1.06 1.14 14.5 -20.4 4.1 (0.09) 0.63 
340 1.04* 0.21 -2.68 2.88** -1.11 34 {0.00) 0.94 
341 5.57 9. -0.9 6.5 -171 5.5 (0.06) 0.71 
347 1.68** 6.12* -0.58* 12.9* -23.3 53.4 (0.00) 0.96 
348 1.18 3.28 -0.72 14.1 -71.2 8.9 {0.02) 0.81 
635 2.73* 8.29* 2.81 25.7** 9.6 23.64 0.92 
(0.00) 
636 2.77* 6.66* -2 27.6** -147* 13.8 {0.01) 0.87 
638 1.7 -0.26 0.57 16.5* -13.3 11.3{0.01) 0.85 
639 0.68 -5.76 -0.53 14.4** -67 19.8{0.00) 0.91 
640 0.8 -24.4 1.11 16.9 -22.4 8.5 {0.02) 0.8 
641 -1.8 16.6 1.5* 28.1* -71.1 18.3 {0.00) 0.9 
648 1.4 0.5 1.6 13.8 -30.4 13 {0.01) 0.86 
651 0.75* 15.7* -6.4* 13.8* -97 23.5 (0.00) 0.92 
*P-Value<0.05 **P-Value<0.01 
All variables are estimated in log form. There were 77 textile and apparel products from the PRC 
under quotas to the USA market. For Vietnam, given their limited exposure to the US market, there 
were 20 categories, for the years 1995-2004, where there may have been direct competition. From the 
20 products the reported regression results are for 16 categories where the F test was significant. 
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